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Abstract 
 
In the past decades, most of the countries in Sub-Saharan Africa have been affected by armed 
conflicts. By means of a time-series cross-sectional (TSCS) database, we attempt to measure the 
impact of war on a sample of 43 countries in Africa from 1950 to 2010. These conflicts, and especially 
civil wars, are shown to have a strong negative effect on the educational performances of the 
countries studied. The rate of children not attending school, as well as secondary school enrollment 
rates, seems particularly sensitive to periods of conflict. It also appears that government expenditures 
in social sectors including education are a positive factor in increasing school enrollment. In contrast, 
military expenditure is significantly and inversely related to schooling opportunities. Thus, if an extra 
1% only of the GDP were allocated to education expenditure, the rate of children not attending school 
would decrease by 1.7%, the primary and secondary completion rates would increase respectively by 
4.4% and by 2.6%. The gender analysis shows that education expenditures provide a better retention 
of girls in the school system.  
 
 
Résumé 
 
Au cours de ces dernières décennies, la plupart des pays d’Afrique subsaharienne ont connu 
au moins un conflit armé. Cette étude présente des résultats préliminaires sur l’impact de ces conflits 
sur l’éducation entre 1950 et 2010 sur un panel de 43 pays d’Afrique. Les conflits et plus spécialement 
les guerres civiles ont un effet négatif très fort sur les performances éducatives des pays. Les non 
scolarisation et le secondaire paraissent particulièrement sensibles aux périodes de conflit. Il apparait 
également que les dépenses gouvernementales dans les secteurs sociaux et notamment en éducation 
sont un facteur favorable à l’augmentation des taux de scolarisation. A contrario, les dépenses 
militaires diminuent de façon significative les chances de scolarisation. Ainsi, si seulement 1% du PIB 
était alloué en direction de l’éducation, le taux de non scolarisation diminuerait de 1,7% tandis que le 
taux de scolarisation secondaire augmenterait de 2,2%.L’analyse du genre montre que les dépenses 
d’éducation permettent une meilleure rétention des filles à l’école.    
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1. Introduction 
 
Armed conflicts cause major damage and bring with them devastating consequences 
for a country, including casualties, displacement of populations, and the destruction of public 
infrastructure. In the long term, it appears to be very difficult to re-establish peace after a 
period of conflict. A World Bank report (2003) showed that the economic and social costs of 
wars are high and that they persist for years after the end of the conflict. In recent years, there 
has developed a substantial literature in which researchers debate the long-term negative 
consequences of armed conflicts. For instance, Brakman, Garretsen and Schramm (2004) 
show that the Allied bombing had a significant but temporary impact on post-war city growth 
in Germany as a whole, as well as in West Germany separately (although this is not the case 
for city growth in East Germany). Most studies arrive at similar conclusions. Miguel and 
Roland (2006) present evidence drawn from the American bombing in Vietnam. They find 
that war had no lasting impact on poverty rates, consumptions levels, literacy, infrastructure 
or population density. Chen, Loayza and Reynal-Querol (2007) analyze a panel of 41 
countries involved in internal wars during the period 1960-2003 and find that when the end of 
war marks the beginning of lasting peace, recovery and improvement in economic 
performance, health, education and political development are indeed significant.  
In the last decades, almost three-fourths of all countries in Sub-Saharan Africa (SSA) 
have been affected by armed conflicts (Gleditsch et al., 2002). Situations of conflict are often 
considered to be one of the most important factors in the deterioration of education. For 
example, Akresh and de Walque (2008) demonstrate the strong negative impact of Rwanda’s 
genocide on children’s schooling, with exposed children completing one-half year less 
education, resulting in an 18.3% decline in school completion. In the first place, children are 
often the first victims of wars: Bird (2007) underlines that two million children have died in 
the past decade as a consequence of armed conflict within the SSA region, and six million 
more have been injured or permanently disabled. In addition, as O’Malley (2010) points out, 
education, as one of the more visible institutions in the civil society, is often targeted by the 
belligerent parties in countries affected by military conflict. In many cases, an attack on the 
educational system represents an attack on the state. Conversely, certain states or paramilitary 
organizations may target academics in order to neutralize real or imagined opponents. In some 
contexts, there is also a phenomenon of youth recruitment into armed militias (child soldiers). 
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The displacements caused by wars also prevent children’s enrollment in school. In 2009, 27 
million people worldwide were displaced, including 11.6 million people in 21 African 
countries (IDMC, 2010). Evidently, such events entail more drastic effects in Africa, as some 
countries in the region have education participation indicators which are among the lowest in 
the world. In 2007, in SSA, the Net Enrollment Rate (NER) was approximately 72% 
(UNESCO, 2010). Some countries, like Eritrea or Niger, did not even reach the 50% level. On 
average, the literacy rate in SSA was measured at 60%, but in Chad or Sierra Leone, it did not 
exceed 40% of the total population. In the same year, 72 million children worldwide were not 
attending school, of whom 32 million lived in SSA. Since the beginning of the 2000’s, and in 
spite of the fact that African countries have expanded primary enrollments, rapidly developing 
current trends have illustrated a probable failure to reach Universal Primary Education (UPE) 
for 2015 (Easterly, 2009).  
Given this context, the objective of this study is to present preliminary results on the 
effects of war on education in a broad sample of countries in the SSA region. The question is: 
to what extent is school enrollment impacted by armed conflicts? We assume that wars have a 
negative impact on schooling. However, this assumption raises certain issues: do all conflicts, 
whether civil, interstate or international, have the same effects? Are the consequences uniform 
whatever the intensity and duration of the conflict? Are both girls and boys affected equally 
by conflict? By means of a time-series cross-sectional (TSCS) database, we attempt to 
measure the impact of war on a sample of 43 countries in SSA from 1950 to 2010. We 
gathered information on conflict from the Peace Research Institute (PRIO) and indicators of 
civil liberties and political rights from the Freedom House. We then combined educational 
data from the Barro & Lee database and economic data from the Penn World and the World 
Bank’s World Development Indicators.  
 
2. Data and methodology 
 
Our analysis focuses on Sub-Saharan African countries. The African continent includes a 
majority of countries which, in respect to current trends concerning the goal of universal 
education, will not, in all likelihood, achieve the objectives of Education for All (EFA) by 
2015 (UNESCO, 2010). In addition, most of the countries in SSA have been affected by 
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armed conflicts. Thus, 43 Sub-Saharan countries compose our sample of countries (for a list 
of countries with country codes, see Appendix A).  
When studying these countries over time, the main obstacle we face is the lack of data and 
the reliability of that which is available. In this study, we rely on a number of databases 
known for their rigor and relevance. We have thus built from several databases a panel 
database for the period of time from 1950 to 2010 providing information on: 
 
 Armed conflict;  
 Education; 
 Economic situation; 
 Civil liberties and political rights.  
 
A detailed description of our variables, including definitions and sources, is provided in 
Appendix B.  
The information on conflicts is provided by the Armed Conflict Dataset of the 
International Peace Research Institute, Oslo (PRIO)
1
. This database, version 4-2009, identifies 
the number of conflicts for 142 countries from 1946 to 2008. Our panel of countries, each one 
providing an observation, consists of 42 countries (excluding Sao-Tome-and-Principe). The 
data document the conflicts for each country according to four dimensions: 
 
 Territorial armed conflict between a state and a non-state group outside its own 
territory;  
 Interstate armed conflict between two or more states;  
 Internal armed conflict between the government of a state and one or more internal 
opposition group(s) without intervention from others states; 
 Internationalized internal armed conflict between the government of a state and one or 
more internal opposition group(s) with intervention from others states on one or both 
sides.  
 
                                                          
1
 UCDP/PRIO Armed conflict dataset, version 4-2009. Available at http://www.prio.no/ (accessed on 
07/12/2010).  
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The data also characterize the conflicts in respect to their level of intensity. The viewpoint 
here is largely dichotomist: at between 25 and 999 battle-related deaths in a given year, a 
conflict is considered as minor. A minimum of 1,000 battle-related deaths in a given year 
qualifies the conflict as major.  
Over the observed sixty year period, we find that 80% of the countries in our sample were 
engaged in at least one conflict (Appendix C). Only eight countries out of the 43 have never 
been involved in any kind of conflict, either internal or multistate: Benin, Botswana, Malawi, 
Namibia, Sao-Tome-and-Principe, Swaziland, Togo and Zambia.  Some countries have faced 
several conflicts in the course of the same year. Angola and Ethiopia hold the unfortunate first 
place in terms of war in recent decades. Over the 60 years observed, both countries have 
experienced only 16 years without war and Ethiopia has faced up to five conflicts during the 
same sub period. 
The education data comes from the recently updated data set on educational attainment in 
the world established by Barro and Lee
2
. This panel data set was updated in 2010 for 146 
countries, including 33 Sub-Saharan countries. The data show the distribution of the 
educational attainment of the total adult population and of the adult population over the ages 
of 15, 20 and 25 by sex at seven levels of schooling. For each level of education (primary, 
secondary, tertiary), data provide information on participation rates as well as completion 
rates. The rate of children not attending school is also documented. As part of our analysis, we 
particularly focus on children not enrolled in school and on primary school achievement. The 
data are broken down into 5-year intervals, from 1950 to 2010. In our analysis, these data 
have been annualized.  
In one main component of our analysis, we use economic data provided by the Penn 
World Table
3
. This database, composed of 35 variables, displays a set of national accounts 
covering a spatial dimension of 189 countries, and the period 1950-2007 (with 2005 as base 
year) as time reference. For the needs of our study, we collected data concerning GDP per 
capita and investment share of real GDP per capita from 27 countries in SSA. Most data are 
available from 1960. We also selected some complementary economic data provided by the 
                                                          
2
 Barro, R.J., Lee, J.W., 2010. A new data set of educational attainment in the world, 1950-2010. National 
Bureau of Economics Research Working Paper 15902. Available at http://www.barrolee.com/ (accessed on 
07/12/2010).  
3
 Alan Heston, Robert Summers and Bettina Aten, Penn World Table Version 6.3, Center for International 
Comparisons of Production, Income and Prices at the University of Pennsylvania, August 2009. 
http://pwt.econ.upenn.edu/ (accessed on 07/12/2010).  
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World Bank’s World Development Indicators4. These data concern the total spending on 
education (in % of GDP), military expenditure (in % of GDP) and the general government 
final consumption expenditure (in % of GDP). Because these data are more accurate than the 
previously mentioned set, it will be interesting to analyze them in the light of our hypotheses.  
Finally, we added to our database the set of comparative and historical data established by 
the Freedom House in the World
5
. These data are the standard-setting comparative 
assessments of global political rights and civil liberties. Published annually since 1972, the 
survey ratings and narrative reports concern 193 countries and 15 related and disputed 
territories, including all the countries in our sample. The score indicated in the database is the 
average of the separate scores for civil liberties and political rights. In the Freedom House 
ranking, countries whose combined average for political rights and civil liberties fell between 
1.0 and 3.0 (i.e., 1.0≤avg_pr_cl<3.0) were designated “free”; between 3.0 and 5.5 (i.e., 
3.0≤avg_pr_cl<5.5) “partly free”; and between 5.5 and 7.0 (i.e., 5.5≤avg_pr_cl≤7.0) “not 
free”.  
The empirical analysis explores the behavior patterns of education variables during 
periods of armed conflict. Using TSCS data
6
, we test the impact of various economic, social 
and political variables on education variables. In this context, we preferred a simple method 
of fixed-effects (FE) regression, one for each SSA country. This provides a first evaluation of 
the effects of armed conflict by estimation through Ordinary Least Squares (OLS). The panel 
literature includes extensive debate about how to model effects, and in particular, whether we 
should treat them as fixed or random. For TSCS data, fixed effects are a more appropriate 
choice, whereas random effects are used for panel data (Beck, 2001).  
The fixed-effect regression can be modeled as follows:  
Yi,t = αi + βXi,t + µi,t 
µi,t = αi + єit 
 
Where Yit is the dependant variable observed for individual i at time t; αi is the unobserved 
individual effect, β the parameter of interest and µi,t the error term.  
 
                                                          
4
 Available at http://databank.worldbank.org/ddp/home.do (accessed on 07/12/2010).  
5
 Available at http://www.freedomhouse.org/template.cfm?page=1 (accessed on 07/12/2010).  
6
 A database is a TSCS when: T > 1, N > 1 and N < T.  
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3. Results 
 
Adopting this causal framework in the statistical modeling that follows
7
, we selected 
three educational variables: the rate of children not attending school, the primary school 
completion rate and the secondary education enrollment rate. As part of our preliminary 
results, we chose to limit the explanatory variables. In terms of the variables of conflict, 
preliminary tests revealed that the variable “internal armed conflict” was more significant 
than the other three variables of conflict (territorial armed conflict, interstate armed conflict 
and internationalized armed conflict). It therefore seemed interesting to aggregate the latter 
into a single variable (called “Other conflict” in our models) and compare it to the first 
variable of conflict (called “Civil conflict” in our models). To appreciate the effect of conflict 
on education, we also selected the variable “intensity”.  
In terms of economic variables, we chose the GDP per capita, the investment share of 
real GDP per capita, the military and education expenditures, both also defined as a share of 
GDP. In order to take diffusion effects into account, these economic variables were lagged for 
five years in the models (indicated “L5” below). 
As for the approach we selected to treat the data in a panel reference, it seemed 
meaningful to broadly decompose the variety of sources in search of that which is 
endogenous. When analyzing primary education completion rate, the average correlation 
within countries reaches a level of 0.64; on the other hand, correlation within years over the 
entire period studied reaches a level of 0.06. Respective values for the rate of children not 
attending school are 0.57 and 0.34 and 0.44 and 0.32 for the rate of secondary enrollment. In 
this way, spatial dispersions outbalance dispersion due to dynamic effects, particularly in the 
case of the primary completion rate. 
 
                                                          
7
 For our empirical analysis, we used the software Stata, version 11.0.  
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Table 1 
Fixed-effect regression (robust), Rate of children not in school (15 years and over).  
Dependant variable :  
Rate of children not 
in school 
Explanatory variables 
Coefficients 
Total Girls Boys 
 
Civil conflict 
4.247*** 
[1.499] 
4.75*** 
[1.696] 
3.748*** 
[1.40] 
 
Other conflicts 
2.965** 
[1.365] 
2.769* 
[1.538] 
3.158*** 
[1.268] 
 
Intensity 
-1.519 
[0.951] 
-1.39 
[1.131] 
-1.646** 
[0.852] 
 
GDP per capita (L5) 
-0.002*** 
[0.000] 
-0.002*** 
[0.000] 
-0.002*** 
[0.000] 
 
Investment share of real GDP (L5) 
-0.138** 
[0.658] 
-0.132** 
[0.061] 
-0.143** 
[0.721] 
 
Military expenditures (L5) 
0.323*** 
[0.941) 
0.284*** 
[0.917] 
0.362*** 
[0.994] 
 
Education expenditures (L5) 
-0.638*** 
[0.186] 
-0.371** 
[0.187] 
-0.903*** 
[0.201] 
Constant 
Adjusted R-Squared 
Observations/countries 
48.230*** 53.522*** 42.991*** 
0.9746 0.978 0.968 
429 / 28 429 / 28 429 / 28 
Notes: Robust standard errors in brackets; *significant at 10%, **significant at 5%, ***significant at 1%. 
 
In this model (Table 1), we find that the variables of conflict have a positive and 
significant effect on the rate of children not attending school. The assumption that conflicts 
increase the non enrollment rate is thus verified in the first model, and this impact is similar 
both for boys and girls. Military expenditures, which generally increase during a conflict, also 
have a positive and significant effect.  
In contrast, the variables “education expenditures” and “investment share” have a negative 
effect. They thus act to reduce the proportion of children not attending school. The GDP is 
also significant although its coefficient is low compared to the other two variables.  
Finally, the variable “intensity”, describing the severity of a conflict, has a negative but not 
significant effect in terms of usual confidence levels, except for boys.  
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In light of these initial results, it is interesting to analyze the average marginal effects 
by computing the elasticity effect of the explanatory variables. By means of this procedure
8
, 
we pose the following quantitative question: how much would our dependent variable 
increase if the independent variable had increased by 1% five years ago? 
 
Table 2 
Average marginal effects (robust).  
Dependant variable: 
Rate of Children not in 
school 
Explanatory variable 
Coefficients 
Total Girls Boys 
 Education expenditures (L5) 
-0.017*** 
[0.004] 
-0.008** 
[0.004] 
-0.030*** 
[0.007] 
 Military Expenditures (L5) 
0.008*** 
[0.002] 
0.006*** 
[0.002] 
0.012*** 
[0.003] 
Observations 429    
Notes: Robust standard errors in brackets; *significant at 10%, **significant at 5%, ***significant at 1%. 
 
 Based on these results, we can say that if education expenditures had increased by 1% 
five years ago, the rate of children not attending school would have decreased by 1.7%. 
Conversely, if military expenditures had increased by 1%, the rate of children not in school 
would have increased by 0.8%. The disparity between girls and boys is more significant. 
Indeed, the rate of boys not attending school would decreased by 3% and the rate of girls by 
“only” 0.8%. Thus, spending on education would be first allocated to boys in early grades. In 
other words, demand of education within families gives advantage for boys.  
                                                          
8
 In terms of techniques, our results were obtained using the mfx command in the Stata statistical package. 
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Table 3 
Fixed-effect regression (robust), Primary education completion rate (15 years and over). 
Dependant variable :  
Primary completion 
rate 
Explanatory variables 
Coefficients 
Total Girls Boys 
 
Civil conflict 
-2.495 
[2.158] 
-2.776** 
[1.504] 
-2.632** 
[1.150] 
 
Other conflicts 
-0.722 
[1.913] 
-2.123 
[1.381] 
-1.701* 
[1.001] 
 
Intensity 
1.564 
[1.469] 
1.171 
[1.051] 
-1.051 
[0.786] 
 
GDP per capita (L5) 
0.002*** 
[0.000] 
-0.000 
[0.000] 
0.000 
[0.000] 
 
Investment share of real GDP (L5) 
0.140* 
[0.086] 
0.05 
[0.06] 
0.053 
[0.04] 
 
Military expenditures (L5) 
-0.002 
[0.079] 
-0.101* 
[0.057] 
-0.0122 
[0.045] 
 
Education expenditures (L5) 
1.126*** 
[0.263] 
0.734*** 
[0.224] 
-0.077 
[0.133] 
Constant 
Adjusted R-Squared 
Observations/countries 
14.282*** 15.503*** 19.621*** 
0.9164 0.936 0.964 
429 / 28 429 / 28 429 / 28 
Notes: Robust standard errors in brackets; *significant at 10%, **significant at 5%, ***significant at 1%. 
 
In this model (Table 3), the variables “civil conflict”, “other conflicts” and “military 
expenditures” have a negative effect on the primary school completion rate, as well as for 
girls than for boys. This trend may justify our assumptions although these variables are not 
always significant.  
On the other hand, other economic variables have a positive and significant effect. We can say 
that social spending, particularly that targeted to education (“education expenditures”), 
increases the primary school completion rate, particularly for girls. This is verified by the 
average marginal effects (as for the first mode, Table 1): 
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Table 4 
Average marginals effects (robust).  
Dependant variable: 
Primary completion rate 
Explanatory variable 
Coefficients 
Total Girls Boys 
 
Education expenditures (L5) 
0.044*** 
[0.001] 
0.039*** 
[0.012] 
0.003 
[0.006] 
 
Military Expenditures (L5) 
-0.000 
[0.003] 
-0.005* 
[0.003] 
-0.000 
[0.002] 
Observations 429    
Notes: Robust standard errors in brackets; *significant at 10%, **significant at 5%, ***significant at 1%. 
 
In a general way, primary completion rate would have increased by 4.4% if education 
expenditures had increased by 1% five years ago. Unlike the case of children not attending 
school, girls here benefit more than boys of education spending. Indeed, if education 
expenditures had increased by 1%, girls receive a 3.9% for primary completion rate. Results 
show that this additional expenditure has no significant effect for boys in respect with the data 
we used.  
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Table 5  
Fixed-effect regression (robust), Secondary education enrollment rate (total, 15 years and 
over). 
Dependant variable :  
Secondary enrollment 
rate 
Explanatory variables 
Coefficients 
Total Girls Boys 
 
Civil conflict 
-2.271** 
[1.053] 
-2.205** 
[1.011] 
-2.337** 
[1.113] 
 
Other conflicts 
-2.137** 
[0.923] 
-2.185*** 
[1.381] 
-2.089** 
[0.980] 
 
Intensity 
0.376 
[0.799] 
0.422 
[0.767] 
0.33 
[0.844] 
 
GDP per capita (L5) 
0.004*** 
[0.000] 
0.004*** 
[0.000] 
0.004*** 
[0.000] 
 
Investment share of real GDP (L5) 
0.108** 
[0.045] 
0.093** 
[0.041] 
0.122** 
[0.05] 
 
Military expenditures (L5) 
-0.124** 
[0.061] 
-0.088 
[0.057] 
-0.016*** 
[0.066] 
 
Education expenditures (L5) 
0.505*** 
[0.173] 
0.44*** 
[0.180] 
0.057*** 
[0.174] 
Constant 
Adjusted R-Squared 
Observations/countries 
12.742*** 8.933*** 16.513*** 
0.9765 0.975 0.977 
429 / 28 429 / 28 429 / 28 
Notes: Robust standard errors in brackets; *significant at 10%, **significant at 5%, ***significant at 1%. 
 
Turning now to the secondary school enrollment rate (Table 5), our results are 
appealing. They confirm previous results. Conflicts and related expenditures (military 
expenditures) have a negative effect, while social spending has a positive one. In this model, 
and contrary to our findings concerning primary education (Table 3), coefficients are 
significant (except impact of military expenditures change for girls). Conflicts therefore have 
a very strong impact on secondary enrollment.  
The average marginal effects are also interesting, particularly in gender analysis:  
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Table 6 
Average marginal effects (robust).  
Dependant variable: 
Secondary enrollment 
rate 
Explanatory variable 
Coefficients 
Total Girls Boys 
 
Education expenditures (L5) 
0.022*** 
[0.007] 
0.024*** 
[0.009] 
0.021*** 
[0.006] 
 
Military Expenditures (L5) 
-0.005** 
[0.002] 
-0.005 
[0.003] 
-0.006*** 
[0.002] 
Observations 429    
Notes: Robust standard errors in brackets; *significant at 10%, **significant at 5%, ***significant at 1%. 
 
If we compare the marginal effects above to those computed for the rate of children 
not attending school (Table 2), we note that they are more pronounced in the case of the 
secondary enrollment rate. Indeed, if education expenditures had increased by 1% five years 
ago, secondary school enrollment would have increased by 2.2%. If military expenditures had 
increased by 1%, this rate would have decreased by 0.5%. For girls, this increase is at level 
2.4% against 2.1% for boys. As for primary completion rate, girls have more benefited from 
this increase. To check this trend, we conducted the same analysis on secondary school 
completion rate: 
 
Table 7 
Average marginals effects (robust) 
Dependant variable: 
Secondary completion 
rate 
Explanatory variable 
Coefficients 
Total Girls Boys 
 
Education expenditures (L5) 
0.026*** 
[0.009] 
0.041*** 
[0.011] 
0.016* 
[0.009] 
 
Military Expenditures (L5) 
-0.006 
[0.005] 
-0.007 
[0.006] 
-0.006 
[0.006] 
Observations 429    
Notes: Robust standard errors in brackets; *significant at 10%, **significant at 5%, ***significant at 1%. 
 
Here, the difference between girls and boys is more significant. If education 
expenditures had increased by 1% five years ago, 4.1% more girls could reach completion for 
secondary against 1.6% for boys.  
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The R-squared (R
2
) in the models merits commentary. Indeed, its analysis reveals that 
the explanatory variables account for a large part of the variance in the models. In the analysis 
of our data by Stata, we had the choice between two main commands: xtreg, fe and areg. We 
chose the areg procedure. This command includes the robust option for the correction of 
heteroskedasticity in groups
9
 using White’s method. In fact, the coefficient estimates and 
standard errors are the same using the xtreg, fe and areg procedures, but the calculation of the 
R
2
 is different. In the areg procedure, we estimate coefficients for each of our covariates and 
for each dummy variable in our groups. In the xtreg, fe procedure, the reported R
2
 is obtained 
simply by fitting a mean deviated model where the effects of the groups (all of the dummy 
variables corresponding to country cases) are assumed to be fixed quantities. All the group 
effects are simply subtracted out of the model and no attempt is made to quantify their overall 
effect on the fit of the model. The SSE (sum-of-squares-error) is the same regardless of which 
approach we take, but the SST (sum-of-squares total) is different. In the xtreg, fixed-effect 
approach, the R
2 
reported is not the
 
R
2 
that is calculated from the regression for areg, but the 
regression for the mean detrended dataset. As such, the SST in the xtreg, fe approach is less 
than the SST in the areg approach. The difference is real. When adopting the xtreg, fe method, 
the effects of the groups are fixed and unestimated quantities which are subtracted out of the 
model before the fit is performed. In the areg approach, the group effects are estimated and 
affect the total sum of squares of the model under consideration. The examples below 
illustrate this point:  
                                                          
9
 Statistical phenomena which may be magnified in the present situation by the huge differences in the sizes of 
the countries in our sample. 
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Table 8 
Fixed-effect regression (robust), Rate of children not in school (15 years and over), 
comparison between areg and xtreg, fe commands (Stata).  
Dependant variable :  
Rate of children not in 
school 
Explanatory variables 
Coefficients 
Model 1 
(xtreg,fe) 
Model 2 
(areg) 
 Civil conflict 4.246*** 
[1.623] 
4.247*** 
[1.499] 
 Other conflicts 2.964 
[1.972] 
2.965** 
[1.365] 
 Intensity -1.519 
[1.293] 
-1.519 
[0.951] 
 GDP per capita (L5) -0.002*** 
[0.000] 
-0.002*** 
[0.000] 
 Investment share of real GDP (L5) -0.138*** 
[0.487] 
-0.138** 
[0.658] 
 Military expenditures (L5) 0.323*** 
[0.884] 
0.323*** 
[0.941] 
 Education expenditures (L5) -0.638*** 
[0.196] 
-0.638*** 
[0.186] 
 Constant 48.230*** 48.230*** 
 Adjusted R-Squared - 0.9746 
 
R-squared 
Within 
Between 
Overall 
0.1616 
0.3515 
0.3291 
- 
- 
- 
 Observations/countries 429 / 28 429 / 28 
Notes: Robust standard errors in brackets; *significant at 10%, **significant at 5%, ***significant at 1%. 
 
First, the comparison between the two models shows that the coefficients are identical, 
except for the variable “other conflicts”.  
Xtreg, fe computes three R-squared values. The “R2 within” gives the share of intra-
individual variability of the dependent variable explained by the explanatory variables. The 
“R2 between” considers the contribution of the fixed effects to the model. The “R2 overall” 
reflects the overall quality of the regression.  
In the example given above, we can say that variety within the country explains 16% of the 
variance in the model whereas variety between countries accounts for 35%. 
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Table 9 
Fixed-effect regression (robust), Secondary enrollment rate (total, 15 years and over), 
comparison between areg and xtreg, fe commands (Stata).  
Dependant variable :  
Secondary enrollment 
rate 
Explanatory variables 
Coefficients 
Model 1 
(xtreg,fe) 
Model 2 
(areg) 
 Civil conflict -2.271 
[1.304] 
-2.271** 
[1.053] 
 Other conflicts -2.137 
[1.583] 
-2.137** 
[0.923] 
 Intensity 0.376 
[1.039] 
0.376 
[0.799] 
 GDP per capita (L5) -0.004*** 
[0.000] 
0.004*** 
[0.000] 
 Investment share of real GDP (L5) -0.108*** 
[0.391] 
0.108** 
[0.045] 
 Military expenditures (L5) -0.124*** 
[0.709] 
-0.124** 
[0.061] 
 Education expenditures (L5) 0.505*** 
[0.157] 
0.505*** 
[0.173] 
 Constant 12.742*** 12.742*** 
 Adjusted R-Squared - 0.9765 
 
R-squared 
Within 
Between 
Overall 
0.2385 
0.5265 
0.5613 
- 
- 
- 
 Observations/countries 429 / 28 429 / 28 
Notes: Robust standard errors in brackets; *significant at 10%, **significant at 5%, ***significant at 1%. 
 
In Table 9, variety within the country explains 23% (“R2 within”) of the variance in 
the model whereas variety between the countries accounts for 35% (“R2 between”). We note a 
difference in the variables of conflict. Indeed, the coefficients are similar but in model 1, they 
are not significant.  
In both cases, we can conclude that variety is mainly explained by the difference 
between countries rather than by intra-individual variety. 
Finally, we tested the Freedom House’s indicators on the educational performances. 
Freedom House ranks countries in terms of political rights and civil liberties. Countries are 
classified according to various indicators which translate the situation in the country, at a 
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particular observation date, for objectives that are derived to a large extent from the Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights. Obviously, these objectives are documented by means of 
factual events such as the transparency of political choice, liberty in the press and so on 
(reference to latest FH report). Countries are assessed as free, partly free, or not free in terms 
of political rights and civil liberties in accordance with the value attributed each year to each 
country for these two indicators. Each indicator is scaled from the value of 1, the best 
situation, to the value of 7, the worst. 
Our present hypothesis is based on the fact that these two indicators may be impacted 
by the population’s participation in education. In fact, we must use extreme caution, as such a 
hypothesis is largely impossible to test without the expected spurious correlations and 
structural effects. One fractional issue might be to chart the evolution of both indicators in 
respect to three main explaining factors: the indicator of school participation, GDP per capita 
taken as a trend for economic development and the occurrence of a conflict during the 5 year 
span that preceded the observations. 
In this case, we could adopt a panel approach, as the variation of indicators and 
variables is here largely heterogeneous within countries; we calculate panel-corrected 
standard error (PCSE) estimates for linear cross-sectional time series models where the 
parameters are estimated by either OLS or Prais–Winsten regression10. When computing the 
standard errors and the variance–covariance estimates, the procedure used assumes that the 
disturbances are, by default, heteroskedastic and contemporaneously correlated across panels. 
We did not use fixed effect dummies here, so the variety explained is low. Results concerning 
primary school achievement are to be rejected due to their lack of confidence. For other 
variables, the impact of past or present conflict shows a marginal value close to 0.5 for both 
the political rights and civil liberties scales. Despite its high significance, the marginal impact 
for the uneducated population at age 15 is low. A simulation of marginal impact, that is to say 
a decrease from the 20% level to the 10% level in this uneducated population, results in a 
decline of around 0.25 in both scales of political rights and civil liberties. Impact effects from 
change in secondary education are higher, as, for example, a move from 20% to 30% means a 
decline (more liberties) of around 0.30 in both scales of freedom potential. 
 
                                                          
10
 Using the xtpcse procedure in Stata. 
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Table 10 
 Impact of no school at age 15, economic growth and conflicts on liberties and political rights.  
Explained GDP per capita 
No school at 
age 15 
Conflicts have  
occurred in past 5 years 
Constant R2 
Political rights -.0000872*** .0093729*** 0.47249** 5.12 0.1081 
Civil Liberties -.0088601*** .000126*** 0.49647** 4.54 0.071 
Notes: *significant at 10%, **significant at 5%, ***significant at 1%.  
Estimations included 824 observations sampled in 22 Sub-Saharan countries, from the period 1965 to 2007. 
 
Table 11 
Impact of participation in secondary schooling, economic growth and conflicts on liberties 
and political rights.  
Explained GDP per capita 
Secondary 
participation 
Conflicts have  
occurred in past 5 years 
Constant R2 
Political rights -.0000263*** -.019383*** 0.39595** 5.63 0.1513 
Civil Liberties -.000026* -.020099*** 0.417387** 5.25 0.1032 
Notes: *significant at 10%, **significant at 5%, ***significant at 1%.  
Estimations included 824 observations sampled in 22 Sub-Saharan countries, from the period 1965 to 2007. 
 
4. Discussion 
 
 These preliminary results confirm that armed conflicts have a strong negative impact 
on education. Indeed, results show that the rate of children not attending school as well as that 
of secondary school enrollment is very sensitive to conflicts (Tables 1 and 5). The model 
presented in Table 3 shows that the primary completion rate appears to be less affected. 
Nevertheless, as demonstrated in the cases of secondary school and children not in school, 
when the country's resources are allocated to education, they contribute significantly to 
improving school enrollments. Military expenditures have the opposite impact since school 
enrollments decrease under its effect. In a general way, the calculation of the average 
marginal effects (Tables 2, 4 and 7) demonstrates that the rate of children not attending school 
could decrease by 1.7%, the primary and secondary completion rates would increase respectively by 
4.4% and by 2.6% if an extra 1% only of the GDP were allocated to education expenditures. 
The secondary school enrollment rate would increase by 2.2% (Table 6). These findings 
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indicate that a rise in education investment has two effects: on the one hand, the primary 
school completion rate increases; on the other hand, further study in secondary school also 
increases significantly. The discrimination between girls and boys is instructive. Education 
expenditures benefit first to boys (Tables 1 and 2). Certainly by choice inside families, boys 
are first enrolled in school rather than girls. Then, results show that along school career, these 
expenditures have more marginal effects on girls. Indeed, if an extra 1% only of the GDP 
were allocated to education expenditures, the completion rate of girls for primary would 
increase by 3.9% (Table 4). On the other hand, in secondary school, the enrollment rate would 
increase by 2.4% for girls against an increase at level 2.1% for boys (Table 6). The 
completion rate is more significant. Indeed, respectively for girls and boys, this rate could 
increase by 4.1% against 1.6% (Table 7). Thus, investment in education provides a better 
retention of girls in the school system, both in primary education and secondary education. 
Certainly, UPE is one of the goals of EFA, but several studies have highlighted the 
importance of secondary school. In a study of fragile states, Chauvet and Collier (2007) 
underline that one of the characteristics of these states is the relentless nature of their fragility 
and the lack of reforms. The introduction of reforms, including in particular a wealthier 
economy, is considered to be a necessary condition for the advancement of fragile states out 
of the category. Unfortunately, the econometric estimation of a state’s likelihood of out of the 
fragile state category suggests that each year, the chances are less than 2% that a substantial 
impetus will begin. This implies that fragile states remain so an average of approximately 55 
years. Chauvet and Collier identified factors which contribute to the emergence of a state 
from its fragile status: secondary education, population size, the gross income related to 
natural resources and technical assistance. A 1% increase in the number of those who have 
completed secondary education doubles the likelihood of the implementation of reforms, even 
if this condition has little impact on the progress of reform. In this way, the persistence of 
fragile status decreases from 55 to 37 years. Twenty-two countries in our sample are 
considered as fragile
11
 and 45% of the states involved in internal armed conflict relapse into 
armed conflict within five years (ibid). In fragile states, the risk of civil war may be attributed 
to two major factors: the proportion of young men in the population and the weakness of 
growth (Collier, Hoeffler and Rohner, 2006). Education may in fact have a double effect in 
                                                          
11
 In 2007, the World Bank listed 34 fragile states, including 22 Sub-Saharan countries.  
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limiting the risks of war: at school, young men are busy and a long formal education increases 
their chances of employability. Thus, investment in education can reduce the risk of conflict, 
and our study corroborates previous results highlighting the importance of education in the 
peace process (Miller-Grandvaux, 2009). Education may therefore offer a way out of the “war 
trap” and, by extension, the poverty trap that some countries face. This positive framework is 
only sustainable if certain “returns on investment”, such as the employability of youths, are 
obtained from success in formal schooling. Nevertheless, an increasing literature underlines 
the highly complex relationships between education and conflict. Bush and Saltarelli (2000) 
highlights how education has “two faces”. In its positive face, as we have suggested, 
education can be a pathway to peace building. In the midst of a conflict, its maintenance is a 
means of socialisation and schools may provide an important mechanism for the protection of 
children against abuse (Smith and Vaux, 2003). In its negative face, education might be a 
catalyst for war. Indeed, it can be used as a war weapon in promoting intolerance, in 
excluding certain groups to access to school or in exacerbating ethnic tensions. In some 
countries, the exaltation of nationalism in the history books may result in the rise of 
xenophobia and violence (UNESCO, 1998). Through social exclusion and indoctrination, 
schools can be a vehicle of violence (Novelli and Lopez Cardozo, 2008) as in Rwanda where 
the educational system established since colonial period has favored political, economic and 
social domination of Tutsis on Hutus. Lastly, the decentralisation policies, especially in 
education, could lead to effects counterproductive and deteriorate further a present fragile 
situation (Altinok, 2004). Indeed, Châtaigner and Magro (2007), show that civil wars in 
poorer countries since the end of the Cold War and the early 1990’s are grew out of the 
weakening of states "privatized". With the 9/11 events, these fragile states have become a 
strategic issue for the international development agencies. Rebuild the rule of law and 
strengthen institutions have become a priority. Nevertheless, there is no consensus on what 
the term “fragile states” encompass or exclude. Those working within education aid have 
adopted the terminology “fragile states” but this concept remains ambiguous and appears to 
have come about to fill a conceptual gap in the aid literature (Bengtsson, 2011). Fragile states, 
however, have one common characteristic: being or having been in conflict. But each 
situation is unique and the emergence of conflicts is a complex process in which education 
can be one of many causes inside a chicken or egg causality.   
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So, investment in education is necessary but, this is not a sufficient condition. On the one 
hand, education must be protected from political interference and clientelism (Weber, 2009). 
On the other hand, educational development policies must be supported by a true and genuine 
political will, shared by all the stakeholders. If this is not the case, education may be viewed 
in its negative aspects, reinforcing the idea of the “education trap” as pointed out by Pritchett 
(2001).  
 
5. Conclusion 
 
This study discusses the negative impact of conflict on education. Our empirical 
analysis also indicates that social expenditures, especially expenditures in education, have a 
positive and very significant impact on the educational performance of our sample of 
countries. Military expenditures have the opposite effect. This trend indicates that when a 
country invests in the social sector, particularly in education, school enrollments increase 
significantly. This can also be interpreted as an indicator of government priorities. When a 
government gives priority to the social sector, it sends a signal to the population that lasting 
peace has returned, which in turn raises confidence in the civil peace needed to boost 
investment (Collier and Hoeffler, 2002). Education can then play a part to reduce poverty. 
Moreover, as suggested by Harber (2002), education can be also a vehicle of peace in helping 
to promote democracy. Even if education systems cannot be the exclusive solution to the 
problem of democratisation, it can contribute to cultivate and develop the values and 
behaviors of a democratic political system. Our analysis shows that education can play a role 
in the development of political rights and civil liberties. In addition, the occurrence of civil 
conflicts in Africa is intimately related to government expenditure policy and, thus, the failure 
of a government to commit to a strong redistributive towards social domains such as 
education (Azam, 2001). As we have analyzed, in the midst of a conflict, education can be a 
part of the solution as well it can be also a driver of conflict (Smith, 2010). In some countries, 
it is the school system itself that sows the seeds of war and conflict (Davies, 2005). It is also 
generally accepted that periods of peace are more conducive to investments in the social 
sector. Studies show that pre-conflict periods are often marked by increased military 
expenditures, at the expense of education and / or health. These preliminary results are part of 
a larger work that attempts to highlight the impact of fragility on education. Our findings lead 
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us to raise certain questions for further study and analysis. Indeed, the primary school 
completion rate does not appear to be significantly affected by conflict, unlike the rate of 
children not attending school or that of secondary enrollment. According to our models, the 
intensity of the conflict does not appear to be a relevant factor in enrollment. These questions 
call for further, more in depth study to complete and complement this initial research. 
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Appendix A: Countries and country codes 
 
 Country Country code 
1 ANGOLA  AO 
2 BENIN  BJ 
3 BOTSWANA  BW 
4 BURKINA FASO   BF 
5 BURUNDI  BI 
6 CAMEROON  CM 
7 CENTRAL AFRICAN REPUBLIC  CF 
8 CHAD  TD 
9 CONGO CG  
10 CONGO, THE DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF THE  CD 
11 CÔTE D'IVOIRE  CI 
12 EQUATORIAL GUINEA GQ  
13 ERITREA  ER  
14 ETHIOPIA  ET 
15 GABON  GA  
16 GAMBIA  GM 
17 GHANA  GH 
18 GUINEA  GN  
19 GUINEA-BISSAU  GW 
20 KENYA KE 
21 LESOTHO  LS 
22 LIBERIA  LR 
23 MADAGASCAR  MG 
24 MALAWI  MW 
25 MALI  ML 
26 MAURITANIA  MR 
27 MOZAMBIQUE  MZ 
28 NAMIBIA NA 
29 NIGER NE  
30 NIGERIA  NG 
31 RWANDA  RW 
32 SAO TOME AND PRINCIPE  ST 
33 SENEGAL  SN 
34 SIERRA LEONE  SL 
35 SOMALIA  SO  
36 SOUTH AFRICA  ZA 
37 SUDAN SD 
38 SWAZILAND  SZ 
39 TANZANIA, UNITED REPUBLIC OF  TZ 
40 TOGO TG 
41 UGANDA  UG 
42 ZAMBIA  ZM  
43 ZIMBABWE  ZW 
  Source: International Organisation for Standardization 
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Appendix B: Definitions and sources of variables 
 
Variables Definition Source 
Some primary school  Some primary school education (% of population aged 
15, 20 or over 25 ) 
Barro & Lee dataset 2010 
Primary school completed Primary school completed (% of population aged 15, 20 
or over 25 ) 
Barro & Lee dataset 2010 
Some secondary school  Some secondary school education (% of population aged 
15, 20 or over 25 ) 
Barro & Lee dataset 2010 
Secondary school 
completed 
Secondary school completed (% of population aged 15, 
20 or over 25 ) 
Barro & Lee dataset 2010 
Some higher education Some higher education undertaken (% of population aged 
15, 20 or over 25 ) 
Barro & Lee dataset 2010 
Higher education completed Post-secondary school degree completed (% of 
population aged 15, 20 or over 25 ) 
Barro & Lee dataset 2010 
Government expenditure General government final consumption expenditure (% of 
GDP) 
World Bank’s World 
Development Indicators 
Military expenditure Military expenditure (% of central government 
expenditure) 
World Bank’s World 
Development Indicators 
Investment share Investment share of real GDP per capita (unit %) Penn World Tables 6.3 
GDP per capita Real GDP per capita, current price Penn World Table 6.3 
Territorial conflict Armed conflict between a state and a non-state group 
outside its own territory 
International Peace Research 
Institute, Oslo (PRIO) 
Interstate conflict Armed conflict between two or more states International Peace Research 
Institute, Oslo (PRIO) 
Internal conflict Armed conflict between the government of a state and 
one or more internal opposition  group(s) without 
intervention from other states 
International Peace Research 
Institute, Oslo (PRIO) 
International internal 
conflict  
Armed conflict between the government of a state and 
one or more internal opposition group(s) with 
intervention from others states (secondary parties) on one 
or both sides 
International Peace Research 
Institute, Oslo (PRIO) 
Civil liberties and political 
rights 
Civil liberties and political rights = (political rights + 
civil liberties)/2.  
For Freedom House, countries whose combined average 
for political rights and civil liberties fell between 1.0 and 
3.0 (i.e., 1.0≤avg_pr_cl<3.0) were designated “free”; 
between 3.0 and 5.5 (i.e., 3.0≤avg_pr_cl<5.5) “partly 
free”; and between 5.5 and 7.0 (i.e., 5.5≤avg_pr_cl≤7.0) 
“not free” 
Freedom House 
   
 
 
25 
 
 
Appendix C: Number of conflicts per year observed 
 
Country 
Number of conflicts per period observed Total for 
period 
observed 0 1 2 3 4 5 
ANGOLA 16 40 4 0 0 0 60 
BURKINA FASSO 56 4 0 0 0 0 60 
BURUNDI 44 17 0 0 0 0 61 
BENIN 61 0 0 0 0 0 61 
BOTSWANA 61 0 0 0 0 0 61 
D.R. OF CONGO 44 12 5 0 0 0 61 
CENTRAL AFRICAN R. 56 5 0 0 0 0 61 
CONGO 55 6 0 0 0 0 61 
COTE D’IVOIRE 58 3 0 0 0 0 61 
CAMEROON 55 6 0 0 0 0 61 
ERITREA 57 3 0 0 0 0 60 
ETHIOPIA 16 11 15 7 10 1 60 
GABON 60 1 0 0 0 0 61 
GHANA 58 3 0 0 0 0 61 
GAMBIA 60 1 0 0 0 0 61 
GUINEA 58 2 0 0 0 0 60 
GUINEA EQUATORIAL 39 21 0 0 0 0 60 
GUINEA-BISSAU 47 13 0 0 0 0 60 
KENYA 55 6 0 0 0 0 61 
LIBERIA 49 12 0 0 0 0 61 
LESOTHO 60 1 0 0 0 0 61 
MADAGASCAR 59 2 0 0 0 0 61 
MALI 57 4 0 0 0 0 61 
MAURITANIA 55 6 0 0 0 0 61 
MALAWI 61 0 0 0 0 0 61 
MOZAMBIQUE 34 27 0 0 0 0 61 
NAMIBIA 61 0 0 0 0 0 61 
NIGER 54 6 1 0 0 0 61 
NIGERIA 52 6 2 0 0 0 60 
RWANDA 50 11 0 0 0 0 61 
SUDAN 24 36 1 0 0 0 61 
SIERRA LEONE 51 10 0 0 0 0 61 
SENEGAL 52 9 0 0 0 0 61 
SOMALIA 40 20 0 0 0 0 60 
SAO-TOME & PRINCIPE 60 0 0 0 0 0 60 
SWAZILAND 61 0 0 0 0 0 61 
CHAD 26 32 0 1 1 0 60 
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TOGO 61 0 0 0 0 0 61 
TANZANIA 60 1 0 0 0 0 61 
UGANDA 29 31 1 0 0 0 61 
SOUTH AFRICA 
REPUBLIC 38 16 7 0 0 0 61 
ZAMBIA 61 0 0 0 0 0 61 
ZIMBABWE 52 9 0 0 0 0 61 
Total 2,163 393 36 8 11 1 2,612 
Source: Prio database 
 
Understanding the table: observed over a period of 60 years, Angola was not in conflict for 16 
of those years; 40 times during the period of observation, the country experienced at least one 
conflict and four times, the country had to face two conflicts in the same year. Of the 60 
observed periods, only Ethiopia experienced five conflicts in a single year. Only eight 
countries have not experienced conflict: Benin, Botswana, Malawi, Namibia, Sao-Tome-and-
Principe, Swaziland, Togo and Zambia.  
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